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THE ROLE OF UNIONS IN AFRICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Introduction
Labor unions are important political and economic institutions.

That

unions may have a significant impact in the country in _which they exist is
hardly deniable.

Unions may use their political

power to gain economic

objectives as well as to support other legislation which they favor.

To

obtain their goals unions may follow a course of action that imposes costs on
others

quite

irrespective_ of

whether

or

not

the

goal

is

obtained.

Furthermore, unions may alter the allocation of a country's· resources among
competing users through _their effects on the level and structure of wage
rates.
One of the first things that a student_ of labor organization would note
from a survey of African less developed countries (LDCs) is the significant
presence of trade unions

(se~,

for example,

[1]

[22]).

This might b~

considered surprising since unions are a relatively recent phenomenon in world
economic history •. Indeed, Lofchie and Rosberg state that a major difference
between the historic process of development which occurred in the West and
that which is presently occurring ~n Afican nations is that:
-In Western society ... industrialization was more -or less -completed
long before the establishment of organized trade unions ..• In
Africa, relatively well-organized trade unions have come into
existence at the earliest phase of economic development ... [16, p.6]
There have been many explanations developed in the liteature for this rapid
union growth which has preceded industrialization in most LDCs (see, for
exampfe [15, pp. 302-4]).
The appearance of labor unions in the African LDCs has not al ways met
with a warm welcome from either the government involved or from development
economists.

The governments of unde-rdevel oped countries have not extended a
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warm welcome to the trade unions because they view them as a threat to both
rapid economic growth and political stability.

To the government:

At best," they [unions] constitute annoying pressure groups for
higher real wages and more advanced social services than the economy
can afford at a time when investment is the critical need. · At
worst, they may be led by political radicals dissatisfied with the
. existing system of government. The line of least resistance, the
one followed in all too many cases, is to deprive the unions of
independence of action, if indeed they are permitted to exist at
all. [10, p. 3]
When governments have attempted to control trade union action they.have
generaily

relied

on

the

twin

mechanisms

of

co-optation

and

coercion.

Specifically:
Control .measures include compulsory arbitration, registration of
unions, granting and withholding of patronage, su~veillance and
inspection, government approval of i nternati anal alignment and of
acceptance· of foreign assistance, party · control over union
leadership, and the co-opting· of labor leaders into the political
and administrative apparatus of the government in order to re.duce
the autonomous strength of the unions. [17, p. 33]
Many development economists consider it quite natural that the governments of
LDCs should seek to drastically curtail the power of trade unions when they
are permitted to exist.

Some point out that unions were resisted in the

presently developed countries at the time· of their inception.

To them it

naturally follows that countries at earlier stages of economic development
should more strenuously resist union·ization of the· industrial

labor force.

The LDC governments cl aim that their actions are necessary and in the best
interest of rapid economic development.

Are the exercise of the traditional

union

and to strike,

rights to·. organize,

to bargain,

development under a stable .government antithetical?

and rapid economic

An examination of the

role of the unions in the economice development process seems to indicate that·
the anwser to the question is no.
There have been a number of important i nqui ri. es in.to the role of unions
in the development process, of which the Inter-Univer_sity Study of .!-abor
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Problems

in Economic Development ,sin all

broadest.
Charles

probability

the largest and

Directed by Clark Kerr, John T. Dunlop, Frederick H. Harbinson, and
A.

Myers,

the

project. resulted

in

numerous

publications.

The

aforementioned summarize the principal conclusions of the project in their
book Industrialism and Industrial Man [13].
Kerr and his associates were at first convi need that organized labor
protest would exercise a determinative impact on the development of LDCs.
They· are, however, forced to abandon this formulation.
on

the

determinative

role

of

labor

in

Rather than focusing

explaining

the

pattern

of

industrialization, they found it necessary to explore the role of managerial
and political elites.

Thus, the

authors view the ·institution of industrial

relations, and in particular labor organization not as a reaction to any
particular

industrial

system

industrialization process.

but

rather

as

a

part

of

the

whole .

As a result, the work of the project spawned much

of the development of what we wi 11

view as the major theories .advanced

concerning the role of union in· economic development.

Despite the somewhat

competing nature of much of the work, the members of the project shared one
belief, as Galenson (who edited two books resulting from the project) states·
· "all of us who have worked on this book ~abor in Develcip~ng Economies, and on
the larger project of which it is a part, are convinced that independent trade
unionism and satisfactory economic development are by no means antithetical"
[10, p. 10].

There have been three major theories advanced concerning the role of
unions in the economic development process:

( 1)

the theory of political

unionism, (2) the theory that the role of unions is to contribute to rapid
economic growth, and (3) the theory that the role of unions is to regulate the
conflitt inherent in the development process.

Each of thes~ theories merits a
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detailed examination as each possesses strong and weak points relative to
explaining observed events in the LDSs.
Political Unionism
The proponents of the political unionism theory contend that the trade
unions in developing countries tend to play chiefly political rather than
economic roles.
.

The LDC trade unions are claimed to have expended more energy
.

.

pursuing political goals such as independence than in pursuing economic goals
such as higher wages and better working conditions.

Millen [20] defines the

political union as having six specific characteristics.
are

(1)

the

union 1-s

political

leaders

are

fovolved

These characteristics
daily

in

political

opera~ions and discussions so that the amount of time devoted to direct
political work is an index, (2) the goals of the ·union leadership ·are quite
broad compared to those of Western union leaders and may include modifying tne
major rules governing the· society,

(3)

there

is frequent

use

of_ direct

collective action in support of nonindustrial objectives, (4) with slight
temperance ideological conformity of the leadership is required, (5) there is
a marked tendency toward the formation of political movements, and (6) in the
early stages a political uni on resembles a political party arid may actually be
one;

However,

political

unionism and

economic

unionism are .not mutaliy

excl.usi ve means ·of action but merely two facets of the organizational pattern.
Hence, they may vary in· degree in the operation of a particual r un_ion and some
degree of each is likely found in all unions.
The proponents of this theory clearly believe the degree of political
action to be greater than the degree of economic action within the majority of
LDC trade unions.

In support of their stance they stress. the frequency of

political

1n

strikes

historically

given

to

Third
the

Worl~

nations

nationalist

and

movements

the
in

impetus
these

thes~
nations.

have
In
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addition, they stress the central role that trade unions have played_ in the
structure of many nationalist movements.

They also point out that as a result

of this political leaders are frequently drawn from the trade unions in LDCs.
Finally, emphasis is placed on the importance of labor related issues in the
nationalist period.
There is wide support for this theory and a substantial body of favorable
data has. been gathered.

Its proponents have advanced a wide variety

reasons to explain why LDC trade unions are so politically oriented.

of

Galenson

[11] theorizes that- unions are so politically involved because they possess
too little economic power to effectively attain their goals through collective
bargaining.

The- idea is -that because of an overabundance of unskilled labor

in the LDCs and a lack of a stong commitment by individual workers, unions
lack the stable membership necessary for a high degree of bargaining power.
Since unions are not strong enough to bargain effectively by themselves they
seek access to polltical

power instead.

In their natually weak state the

chances of unions increasing the low· standard· of living substantially are
slight.

Hence, the unions seek- to attain more significant and more rapid

improvements in living conditions through dire.ct political action in the form
of social
causation,

legislation.
he

does

Although Berg would probably not agree with the

substantiate

the

fact

that

in

Africa

significant

improvements in living conditions have arisen from the political arena and not
the collective bargaining process.

This is witnessed by his statement that:

direct union efforts against employers have rarely brought real wage
increases to African labor; it is rather social legislation and the
labor movement 1 s political influence which-have been responsible for
most of the real wage gains·of recent years. [2, p. 227]
Sufrin [26] advances a somewhat similar theory in which the collective
bargaining process- proves to be ineffective to attain the union 1 s goals.

As

he sees it, employers, either by themselves or-with the unions, are simply not
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capable of arriving at satisfactory solutions to the question of wages, hours,
and

conditions

unsatisfactory

of

employment.

solutions

Nor

-

The

stick.

are

the1

market

capable
mechanism

of

making

using

their

c6llective

bargaining, with a written agreement arrived at among the parties involved
does not exist in developing societies -in the same powerful fashion as it does
in developed Western economies.

As a result u·nions in an attempt to carry out

their traditional economic rofo have found it necessary to maintain_a strong
political

lobbying

effort with

government.

This

is

the

case

since

the

·gtivernment either as the center of economic power and control or as the major
employer in the economy is capable of determining more acceptable solutions to
the questions.

Futhermore·, it is capable of making its solutions to the

questions stick either by direct legislation or by setting a pattern for.other
employers to follow.

Thus Sufrin concludes:

In emerging lands government is the political subs_titute for the
economic
market,
providing
mechanisms
of
wage
and
hour
determination, and making decisions based oil criteria different from·
those which guide · the opera ti on of the .economic markets of the
Western World .
.•. the labor role of government in the underdeveloped areas is so
much greater than the role of government in the Western World, that
. in emerging soci~ties the major orientation of uni-0n effort is often
directed toward political "concern rather than toward economic
concern. Thus, collective bargaining plays a lesser role in the new
societies· than -in the old, but politics plays a greater role, even
though the effectness of new governments may be limited. [26, pp.
29-39]
Millen [20] saw still additional factors as explaining the politicizing of
Third World trade unions.

There were a prevalence of revolutionary political

parties in the LDCs that sought to politicize all
society including trade unions.

interest groups - in the

Thi rd World colonial countries tended to be

characterized by a pervasive pattern of racial injustice.

As a result cif

this, white employees were often allowed to organize and bargain collectively
where. natives were not.

Hence,

the native workers tended

to

resort to
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political

means to improve their material

conditions.

Once this pattern

emerged it tended to be self-perpetuating.
Having surveyed what he .considers to be impressive evidence marshalled by
himself

and

other

supporters

of

this

theory

development, Galenson is led to believe that

11

of

the

unfon 1 s

role

in

it should be apparent that the

outlook for non-political unio_nism in the newly developing countries is not
bright.

We may expect, rather, a highly political form of unionism, with a

radical ideology 11 [9, p. 8].
The theory of political unionism as developed so far has a number of·
implications in regard to government attitudes and action tov,ard trade unio~s.
It does not suggest that the newly established governments in ·LDCs should
necessarily seek to re$trict action by trade unions.

After all, this theory

indicates that most of these new governments owe their existence to the
union 1 s efforts against the colonial rulers.

It also seems to indicate that

perhaps it is incorrect to interpret co-optation of union leaders as an
attempt by government to control
causation works the other way.

unions.

It might be the case that the

Perhaps union leaders want to be. co-opted into

the political and administrative apparatus of the government because they feel
they wi 11 be better able to attain their supporters I economic objectives in
that way.

The theory does not conclusively tell us· in which direction the

causation flows. · The political unionism theory does seem to indicate that
colonial governments of the past or those that would seek to continue their
economic policies might have reasons to consider trade.unions as a threat and
hence seek to control them.

A careful examination of the arguments put forth

by the critics of political unionism indicates, however, that historically
this

has

not

been

the

case.

Rather,

trade

unions

were

allowed ~ore

independent action under colonial rule than they have been since- independence
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in•most cases.
trade

As Ananaba [l, p. 6] states,

11

There are probably more African

unionists in jail or in detention, killed or driven into exile by

independent African countries than· was the case during the whole period of
colonial rule. 11

(For detailed studies of colonial policies in Africa, see

[19, ppr 31-52].)
Despite the wide support

for

the political unionism theory it does not

confront the large body of seemingly contradictory evidence in certain parts
of the world, which critics of the theory have be.en quick to pointout.

A

number of studies of African countries have been made with referen~e-to the
issue of political unionism by examining the.relationship between trade unions
and political commitment before independence.
shown support for the theory in practice.
11
·

Most o·f these studies have not
As Henley [12, p. 224] puts it,

one of the persisting myths surrounding African trade unions is that they are

peculiarly committed to politics and parties. 11

He goes on, to note that· 11 in

Kenya,· the theory of political unionism has had few adherents. 11
approaches the issue of political
between
observes

trade

unions .and

unionism by examining the relationship

political

that unions were more

Davies [6]

commitment

overtly

before

independence.

He

political .in the French-speaking

territories than they were: ·in the English-speaking _terri tores.

However, even

within French-speaking Africa only Guinea appears to have come really close to
conforming to the ideals of the political unionism theorists.

In general he

concludes that the political unionism school is very weak when actual African
counties are studied.
unions

early

allied

Thus Davies observes that
themselves

with

the

11

leading

the · instance where trade
political

parties

and

continued to do ~o up to independence are few 11 [6, p. 96].
Other. studies of trade unions in Tropical Africa further substantiate
Davi~s-findings.

Berg and Butler [3] surveyed labor movements in over a dozen

. ______j
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African nations and found_that only two might fi,t into the political unionism
classification.

They point out, however, that it is very difficult to find

elsewhere in Africa the close union party ties observed in Guinea and Kenya.
Of particular importance are the cases of Tanzania and Ghana as these two
countries are frequently cited by the proponents of political unionism as
examples

in

support of

the

theory.

However,

certain

studies

of

these

countries strongly suggest that where the trade unions did actively support
revolutionary movements they did so only to. obtain economic objectives and not
as a reaction "to a particular system of government.

In the case of Tanzania,

trade union action was prompted by opposition to major agricultural employers
[27, p. 410].

In Ghana the unions acted in protest against rapid inflation.

Damachi 1 s [4] case study of Ghanian economic development provides careful
documentation of this phenomenon in relation to the general strike of 1950.
Berg - and Butler are even more adamant -on the issue _of Ghana.

The authors

state that:
The Ghana trade-uni on movement before 1958 not only had 1 imi ted
reactions with the dominant political party, but was one of the
least ideological labor movements in all Africa. It revealed little
int~rest in broad political issues .and goals. [3, p. 351]
Various reasons have been advanced to explain this lack of political
interest during

the

colonial

period.

Roberts

[23]

feels

that

the -most

important factor in explaining behavior in former British territories is the
attitude held by the government 1 s colonial
unions.
part

administrators toward the trade

At least in former British colonies there-were not attempts on the
of

the

government_

to

stifle

union

development~ -

Instead __ the

administrators did what they could to encourage the development of trade
unions and collective bargaining along the European line.

With a strong

framework for collective bargaining insured by the government and rel~tively
autonomous

action

allowed,

trade

unions

had

no

reaso'n

to

challenge

the
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colonial administrations.

Lofchie and Rosberg agree that:

The historic autonomy_ of "trade. unions during the colonial era casts
serious doubts on the assumption that common opposition to European·rule
fomented strong and early bonds between union leadership and nationalist
politicians. It is probably more accurate to interpret colonial rule as
an important factor in accounting for union separatism. [16, p. 44]
.
This substantial body of evidence contradicting.the theory of political
unionsim,

particularly that from Ghana and Tanzania, severely damages its ·

credibility.

Furthermore, this evidence does not justify the present attitude

toward the trade unions that most LDC governments have.

If th~ trade unions

in these countries have traditionally played nonpolitical roles they should
not be a threat to the stability of present governments.

If the unions are

allowed to maintain the independent role which they played under the colonial
administrators,

there

revolutionary.

It would seem that a new government wishing to maintain.

industrial

political

and

appears

no

harmony

reason ·why

should

they

should

guarantee

that

suddenly

the

turn

collective

bargai Iii ng process .continues· to · work as effectively as i.t did during the
country's colonial period.
part of

The implications of just such an approach on the

t~e government will

be examined later.

It

is

clear

that· the

· literature of neither proponents nor the critics of the political unionism
theory contain anything that would subs tan ti ally justify the current acti.ons
against unions.

Indeed some of the views advanced would seem to suggest that

a more fa\lorable attitude toward the unions would be beneficial.
Unions and Rapid Economic Growth
This

approach

to the role of unions

in· the

development process

is.

primarily an attempt to integrate the theory of political unionism and the
Inter-University Study of Labor Problems
the

union's

role

as being

both

in

Economic Development.

political .and economic

in

It views

nature.

The

proponents of this theory advance a role for unions in .LDCs that is widely at
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variance with that played by Western trade unions.
production-oriented one.

The theory is basically a

The union role in development is to help to restrain

·wage demands and thus to reduce ·consumption-oriented activities.· Unions are
to reduce strikes, attempt to increase labor productivity in general, and. to
exert pressure on low-productivity workers
output.

in order to increase national

At first glance these activities certainly seem· counter to the·

consumption-oriented .behavior. of

Western

trade· unions.

Mehta

Schweinitz [25] have been among the most fervent exponents of a

[18]

and

form of trade

unionism in LDCs· that is oriented toward increased production.
The logic behind this theory is quite persuasive.

Suppose that union

leadership has as its objectives the maximization of some welfare function of
its ·members, the self perpetuation of the union, and the self perpetuation of
themselves as the union 1 s leaders.
stagnant,

under developed economy

Considering the first objective, in a
the only way

the union leadership can

appreciably improve their members• welfare is at the expense of other segments
of

the

economy.

To

do

so

substantial economic power.
worse off without a struggJe.

is

going

to

require that the union possess

No one ever knowingly allows himself to be made
This is particul_arly likely to be the casewhen

the person is very near subsistence level as is often the case in most LDCs. ·
Such resistance imposes a cost on the union for any gains they are capable of
achieving.

Unless the unions are exceedingly more powerful than they usually

are in LDCs the cost may be greater than any gains.
purely monetary forms.

These costs may take

More importantly from the standpoint of the union

leaders they might manifest themselves in the form of government restrictions
on the actions or even existence of unions.

Si nee this would endanger the

objective of union self-perpetuation, the leadership must s·eek to improve
their members• welfare in other ways.

The alternative available to them is to·

12

help to promote a rapid economic growth.

This is a particularly appealing

approach as it allows everyone to become better-off within the economy.

In

addition, it is quite likely that the government will reward the unions for
their cooperation through the passage of special social l egi sl ati on whi_ch they
favor.

This will tend to both improve the Linion 1 s position relative to other

segments of the economy and to help perpetuate the uni on as an i nsti tuti on
within the _economy.

So long as everything continues to move rapidly the

leaders will also be able to maintain their positions.
Unions may help to promote rapid economic growth in a number of ways.
start with they must be willing to curtail stikes.

To

In LDCs, as in advanced

countries, unions tend to organize and to have their greatest power in the
most important sectors of the economy.

In the case of most LDCs, the most.

important sector is the public sector as a very substantial portion of the
wage labor force is directly or indirectly employed by the government.

Thus,

a strike by union.members would not only drastically reduce output in the
public sector itself but would in addition have substantial feedback effects
into all

sectors of the economy.

-Considering the economy I s al ready weak

state,· such strikes would have a devastating effect on the government 1 s
attempts to attain rapid economic growth.
It is equally as_important to keep wage levels low at le~st in the short
run.

As Ananaba has noted, in post-independence Africa:
Claims for_ improvement in wages and working conditions were
generally frowned at, ••. because of their likely consequences on the
public sevice, as _the governments--and local authorities and
institutions created by them were the largest employers in
practically every African country. [1, p. 193]

Also,

the capital-investment multiplier effect is felt to give a greater

impetus to growth than that of-consumption.

Keeping wages low allows industry_

to generate a high level of investable profits with such capital investment

13

1eadi ng to rapid economic growth.

An addi tio_nal benefit to the economy from

keeping wages low is a reduction -in unemployment.-

This has a particularly

significant impact since productive methods in LDCs are usually capital not
labor saving.

Also, keeping wages low in the modern sector helps to keep the

urban-rural wage differential small and thus not encourage a mass migration to
the city from the country.

This is important since LDC governments are seldom

capable of providing the social--overhead-capital

necessary to handle such

migrations.
Finally, if trade unions can raise the productivity of their members,
output will increase for a given level of expenditure.

Thus the proponents of

this theory stress that not only is it important that unions not interfere
with management I s attempts to discipline 1ow-productivity workers but rather
complement it through peer pressure [8].

The ultimate result of such a

strategy will be a more rapid rate of economic development.
This view of the union's role in the development process certainly does
not justify the present government attitude toward them.

Though it is true

that unions are seen as functioning as a kind of third arm of the government
they are not doing so because of any overt or covert action on the part of the
latter.

Instead, unions are believed to act in the described manner because

they perceive it to be in their best interest.
the

three

obje<;:tives

of

the

union's

Their acti_ons are motivated by

leadership,

namely members'

maximization, union perpetuation, and leadership perpetuation.

welfare.

This_ theory

strongly suggests that independent trade uni on action and successful economic
development may be complementary ·rather than_contradictory.

Indeed, one of·

its staunch supporters, Mehta, views independent unions as a prerequisite to
successful development.

He states,

11

The desire of trade unions to play

a

-_ decision role in the_ e-conomi c growth of an underdeveloped country can only
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. succeed if they are independent" [18, p. 16]. · 'This view is apparently shared
· by Ghanian trade unions who in· a survey by Damachi "felt that only their
independence

and

their

equal

partnership

with

:the

other

participants

[politicians and management] in. the formulation of national developmental
policies would adequately generate motivation which was essential to workers'
productivity" [5, p. 29].
Unfortunately, this theory seems to be more one of what the role of
unions should be rather than what it is.

Most recent data seems to indicate

that unions in underdeveloped countries act quite similar to their Western
counterparts.

It appears that unions have been either unwilling or unable to

act as an ancillary element of the government.

In the previously cited survey

by Damachi [5] of Ghani an trade uni on members, 100 per cent of the uni on
members responding rel t
purpose

of

trade

that job interest of the workers was the primary

unionism,

whereas

only 30· per

cent of

them. embraced

nation-building as a secondary role.
In many countries the governments have tried to restrict the consumption
proclivity of union members through the institution of forced savings.

The·

idea was t.hat through compulsory savings a large pool of investable fu_nds
could be · created 1eadi ng to a greater rate of capital investment and growth.
Ghana and Tanzania both have attempted to institute a program of compulsory
savings.

In both cases the scheme of imposed savings failed.

· A primary

reason for this failure was a lack of support in the part of the unions [8].
It also
strikes.

apears

that unions

have

not been

successful

in curtailing

Nor does it appear that they _have actually tried to do so.

On the

contrary, unions have acted in cooperation with government only for a price in
the short run.

If the price the government pays is more autonomy for the.

unions, the result may be an increase in strikes.

An example is Ghana during
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:the National Liberation Council government ( 1966-69).
To help ease the problem of implementation [of new policies], the
,military regime enlisted the cooperation of · the · TUC [Trade Uni on
Congress]. But the TUC would not· readily offer its cooperation without a
definite commitment from the government guaranteeing protection of its
interest.
So the TUC was, once more told it was free to organize
democratically and bargain collectively, despite· the fact that th_e
, problems of inflation, balance of payments, and foreign debts remained.
Therefore this phase witnessed an upsurge in strikes, for labor was bent
on easing its frustrations that hao accumulated during the Nkrumah
regime. [4, p. 130]
-_ Once again it appears unions have- been unable or unwilling to act to assist
government plans fo_r rapid economic growth.
Particular emphasis should be place on the fact that unions may _be unable
to help.

The theory had unions acting in the described manner because the

1 eaders

perceived it to be in their best interest.

objective

to maintain

the

union,

the

leaderships

positions of authority within the union.

Now along with the
seek

to

retain

their

To r~tain their offices union

leadership must convince their constituents that they are acting in their best
interest.

A policy which

seeks to restrict consumption in the

face

of

increasing member aspirations is not likely to meet with a_ favorable response.
Since. the weights to be attached to the three objectives of the leadership are
unknown, it is possible ·that the leadership may prefer to risk government
displeasure and maintain control than to cooperate and find themselves out of
a job.

Knowles comments that

11

in an environment of unemployment and poverty,

seniiliterary and superstition, along with lack of experience in collective·
action and group discipline, the vital question is: Can a labor politician or
labor leader become responsible and still remain a leader? 11

[14, p. 293].

The proponents of the theory have amassed a cons i derab 1 e amount of
contradictory evidence.
of

support for

This evidence also presents a relatively strong base

present LDC

government action

at first

inspection.

The

· evidence shows unions if not resisting at 1 east not supporting compulsory
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savings programs.

They cooperate with government only to obtain more power

which they then abuse.

The

union leaders cannot act responsib.ly because the

members do not know their best long-run interest.

All this would certainly

seem to justify strong government restrictions on trade unions.
There is, however, no evidence that unions have acted concertedly to
sabotage compulsory savings programs.

At best the evidence indicates that

union

their members•

leaders

really do not control

actions.

Restricting

unions does not necessarily change the behavior of the individual members.
And this is what the government must do if its programs are to be successful.
The evidence from Ghana indicates that the rash of strikes resulted because of
frustrati ans that had accumulated during a period of heavy restrict ions under
the Nkrumah regime.
of

catching-up

Had the union never faced such restrictions, this period

strikes

would

not

have

been

necessary.

Thus

union

restrictions might prove to be self-perpetuating, since whenever they are
removed at some future date it might lead to a period of agressive union
action.

Furthermore, if restricting trade uni on action does not change the

underlying emoti ans of the members, the government is creating a mass of
frustration that has no organized outlet.

It is highly likely that this

frustration will then be expressed in forms that are potentially more harmful
to a developing economy than that of potential union actions.

This fact was

apparently realized by British colonial rulers in Africa as early as 1930 [1,
pp. 1-2].

Thus a second inspection of the reasoning does not seem to indicate

the present government policies are in the best interest of development.
Unions and Conflict Regulation
The newest theory of the union 1 s role in the development process may
provide the most positive case of the existence of independent trade unions.
The theory views the uni on as being the organizers and regulators of the
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conflict inherent in the development process.
collective bargaining process.

This is carried out through the

The· union serves to channel worker_ protest·

· into socially usefui . forms.
The reasons _why there_ would be social and labor unrest and discontent
during the development period are many and varied.

One of the primary needs

of any developing economy is the development of a relatively large industrial
labor force iri a short period of time. - The shortage of such a labor force
causes a large positive wage differential
sector and the rural
differential
areas.

between the urban industrialized

backward sector of the economy.

This positive wage

induces a migration of manpower from the rural

to the ur_ban

Uninitiated in the ways of modern soci ~ty the mi grant workers often

suffer from urban shock.

Si nee in most cases the mi grant leaves family and

friends in the rural area, he finds himself afone in a culture he does not
under~tand.

In most cases the governments in the LDCs do not have the amount

of resources to provide the necessary soc.ial
burgeoning urban populations.

-The result is a drastic lack of sanitary

facilities, civil servants, and housing.
slums and all
delinquency,

the

social

prostitution,

competition, and so fo'rth.

overhead capital to service

problems
gambling,

This leads ·to the development of

that accompany
alcoholism,

them,

such

as

crime,

discrimination,

unfair

This migration thus poses special problems to the

society that may be somewhat alleviated by the existence of active trade
unions.

As Mehta has pointed out:

Their (immigrants) social .adjustment in the settled population
patterns must be smoqthed, and the trade unions can assist.the State
in this task. One of the main ways in which the problem can be
solved is the provision of industrial housing .. It is possible for·
trade unions to float cooperative housing societies for th~ir
members and thus canalize the flow of immigrants. [18, p. 22]
A related problem in the process of building an industrial- labor force is
the initiating of the new recruit to the discipline of the work routine (see,
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for example [21, pp. 161-68] [12, pp. 228-32]).

As an agricultural worker the

new recruit was basically free to determine his pace and hours of work.
decision was conditioned only by the need to provide a sub·sistence living.

His
In

the case of a family owned farm he was his own boss surrounded by his family.
In the case where he was a hi red laborer or sharecropper he was undoubtedly
well acquainted with and to a certain extent friendly with his landlord.

Now

as an industrial worker he must report for work at a certain time each day and
work at some prescribed minimum rate for a definite number of hours.
abide by the rules and regulations regarding work and safety.

He must

He musf observe

factory protocol and in all ways strictly follow factory discipline.· The new
industrial

worker

accustomed to

the

relative freedom of the agricultural

sector often is annoyed with all the rules and regulations which to him seem
quite arbitrary and which he cannot understand.

The result is a growing

feeling of discontent on the part of the worker [18].
Unions may alleviate this problem by providing the worker with a certain
esprit de corps.

They provide the worker with someone he can turn to for .·
As Henley [12,

interpretation of work rules and support for his grievances.
p·. 238] puts it

11

in this formalization or 'depersonalization' process·, trade

unions have two potential

roles.

The first is to educate workers in· the

exis8ng 'rules of the game' and the second to defend their membership against
retrenchment

and

arbitrary

managerial.

actions. 11

Uni ans

improve

the

individuals self-worth by making him feel that what he·is doing is important
and digified.

Dainachi [5, pp. 32-33] in his survey of Ghanian trade union

members noted that

11

nati onal ly •.• trade unions have aroused the consciousness

of the worker and have. stimulated his interest in national rather than in
tribal objectives ..• and by making him see himself as playing an essential role
in the development pro·cess,

have helped him to

develop

a new · confident
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self-identity. 11

And, primarily unions represent a collective

force to right

what might be unjust about present work regulations and to force employers to
'be effi!=ient.
Unfortunately LDC governments have often led people to believe that a
more rapid ~ate gro~th was possible than actually is.
of the revoluntionary propaganda.

This was often a part

The people were led to believe that simply

disposing of the colonial administration would lead to an immediate increase
in wea 1th for everyone. _ When the governments are unable
promises workers soon begin protest".

to meet their

Unless this protest is controlled and

channeled it might erupt in violent general strikes, work slowdowns and even
open revolt, al 1 of which have harmful effects on the economic stabi 1 i ty of
the country involved.
such pro_test.

The natural functions of unions is the channeling of

Unions therefore are seen to be a very necessary element in a

society in the process of industrial transition.
role in reducing social friction and hance

They play a very jmportant

enabling a more rapid rate of

economic growth.
As .this theory stands, the benefits to LO Cs from the es tab 1i shment of
trade unions are very substantial.
present

Such benefits strongly suggest -that the -

government attitude toward the· uni ans is unjustified.

Furthermore,

it may actually be harmful to the attainment of rapid economic growth.
does, -however,

exist a subs tan ti al

contradict the theory.

body of ·observations

There

that appear

to

Where trade unions do exist they have not always

succeeded in controlling and channeling the conflict.

Trade unions have

participated in the overthrow of th~ government in several co~ntries and the·
'

eruption of violent general strikes in others.

Included among these countries

are Nigeria, Congo-Brazzaville, and Dahomey.
These examples of "trade union inability to contain conflict may be
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explained

by

examination

collectivebarganing.

of

the· necessary

preconditions

of

successful

First, all parties involved·must recognize every other

party as a legitimate representative of a special interest with a right to
participate in the decision-making process.
alway"s the case in the LDCs.

Such mutual recognition is not

Governments and business leaders· alike fail to

recognize the trade unions and with almost equal frequency the unions do not
recognize

the government leaders

populace.

_Mutual

as

true

representatives

of the general

recognition is not the only precondition that -must be

fulfilled, as Galenson points out:
For successful collective bargaining,
approximate equality of bargain1ng power,
parties to forget the lacerations caused
These ingredients are rarely to be
countries. ·[10, p. 6]
One

basic

probJem

that

is

likely

there must be at least
and the willingness of _the
by the bargaining· process.
found in under-developed

to

occur

is

that

business

and

gov_ernments will fail to realize the potential strength of trade unions until
it is forced upon them.

As Friedland notes,

11

The organizational forms of.

African trade unions are often misleading because they appear so weak and so.
chaotic by the standards of industrial societies'' [12, p. 7].

·However, when

one considers them in light of their own environment their strength quickly
increases.

Typically the societies within the _LDCs have few well-organ_ized,

voluntary interest groups outside of -traditional tribal

and family groups.

Further the administration of -LDCs are ofteh relatively weak and lacking
effective means to control labor_ protest and maintain the public_ order.

An

examination of recent history shows that it is often the case that union power
is underestimated.

According to Sandbrook:

too often the smallness of unions in African counties, together with
their financial
and sometimes organizational weaknesses led
observers to conclude that these bodies are no match for a
Yet these unions have
government determined to have its way.
frequently shown a remarkable obstinacy in pursuing traditional
union aims in the face -of _government displeasure. [24, p. 24]
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And in some cases where the governments have underestimated uni on powe_r, the
results have been devastating.
Friedl and
Dahomey.
latter

examines

the

countries

of Ni g_eri a,

Congo-Brazzavi 11 e,

and

In the first country unions resorted to a general strike, and in the
two countries

government.

trade. unions

participated

in

the

overthrow of

the

In all three cases there is substantial evidence that the actions

resulted because of government's failure to recognize the unions as _labor's
representative in the

negotiation process.

There is also some evidence that

this was reinforced by a lack of faith in the government on the part of the
unions.

Friedland in his study of Nigeria observes both of these phenomena as

is evident in the following:
Despite government's _recognition of the Joint Action Committee, the
labor movement had little confidence in the federal government's
intentions throughout the seven months of the Morgan Cammi ssion
inquiries. The subsequent delay in publishing the Commission's
report
and
the
unsatisfactory
nature
of
government's
counter-proposal only heightened labor's suspicions, while also
revealing the government's gross·underestimation of the unions power
to carry out their strike threats.
Efforts of the union leaders to negotiate before the stri'ke
were thwarted by the absence or inaccessibility of key goverment
officials. [7, p. 8]
Thus

one

of

the

largest

obstacles

in

the

path

of

unions

successfully

regulating conflict is the government's failure -to recognize them and to
properly gauge their strength.
An examination of specific cases where conflict regulation has failed
shows the

failure

occurred because

the . necessary preconditions were not

satisfied.

Specifically, it failed because of the attitude and actio~ of LDC

governments toward trade unions._ This theory shows that not only are the LDCs
losing the potential benefits of independent trade unions but that they may
actually be making
themselves - worse off.
.

As Knowles states,

11

In the absence

of established trade unions and established political parties, labor unrest

22

leads to both political and economic instability 11 [15, p. 308].
costs to the political

There are

and economic instability that has. occurred when

conflict regulation has failed, costs that are far too high for a country that
is on th.e threshold of economic growth.
If the governments of the LDCs are seriously interested in the welfare of
their citizens and in their attempts to attai~ a rapid rate of economic growth
· then they must not ·prohibit independent trade. unions. . Rather than acting to
restrict and weaken union action, the LDC ~overnments should ensure that the
1

union s actions have the most beneficial effect for the entire country.

There

is a ~~ed for the governments'and the trade unions to recognize each others
right to exist and their legitimacy to represent their constituents.
· Summary and Canel usi on
It has been observed that the underdeveloped nations bf Africa have been
experiencing a rapid unionization of

their labor force. · There

is

no

historical counterpart to this phenomenon, as the presently developed nations
were considerably more industrialized at the time when rapid unionization
began.

The governments within the African LDCs have for the most part not

reacted favorably to the inception of unionism.

They have instead resorted to

a number of strictures designed to weaken or prevent unions from forming.

The

question arises whether or no~ such actions ~re in the best i~terest of rapid
economic growth.

It is believed that insight.into the answer may be gained by

studying the role of unions in the development process.
There have been three major theories proposed to describe the role unions
play in economic development.

Each of these theories has substantial evidence

in support of it and substantial evidence which appears· to contradict it.
None

of the theories are successful in giving a comprehensive explanation of

observed occurrences in LDCs.

However, partial though they may be, none of
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them in any significant way suggest that unions and successful economic
development are antithetical.

Nor do the critics of the theories present any

evidence in support . of the present government stance.

Rather, al 1 of the

evidence considered seems to indicate that there are benefits associated with
the existence of independent trade unions.
that the present government

Some is so strong that it suggests

stance is not only precluding the attainment of

certain benefits but may .in fact have a damping effect on economic growth.

If

these governments are sin-cere in-their espoused goals~ then they should
definitely reconsider their present policies toward trade unions.
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NOTE
I would like to thank Herbert Werner for.helpful comments on an earlier
draft of this paper.
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